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A REMARK ABLE MILITARY FEAT
The Hungnam Redeployment, December 1950
Donald Chisholm
The difficulty . . . to be got over is to know how not only to invade with
success; but likewise to retreat with safety.
THOMAS MORE MOLYNEUX

I kept the sea always on my flank; the transports attended the movements
of the army as a magazine; and I had at all times, and every day, a short
and easy communication with them. The army, therefore, could never
be distressed for provisions or stores, however limited its means of land
transport; and in case of necessity it might have embarked at any point
of the coast.
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY

A

mphibious operations exploit the great facility and inherent flexibility of
movement and maneuver that the sea affords in order to concentrate military power at the decisive time and place ashore.1 Such operations are founded
on sea control, regularly capitalize on surprise and enemy weakness, and are
usually carried out in support of broader operational and campaign objectives
ashore—severing enemy land lines of communication, establishing lodgments
for follow-on forces, establishing control of choke points or denying the enemy
use of decisive physical points, outflanking less mobile
Dr. Chisholm is professor in the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College. He is the enemy land forces, and the like.
author of Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: Origins and
We are wont to identify amphibious operations with
Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel
System, 1793–1941 (2000), which received the 2001 amphibious assaults, especially those executed during
Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Distin- World War II, when the assault was refined to a high
guished Contribution to Naval Literature, and Coorart. In truth, however, militaries have for many centudination without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in
Multiorganizational Systems (1989), along with nu- ries found it useful to conduct an olio of amphibious
merous articles, chapters of collected works, reviews, operations during peace as well as war. Appropriately,
monographs, and papers. His Spring 2000 article in
this journal on command and control in Korean War therefore, in addition to the assault, U.S. joint doctrine
amphibious operations received three awards.
identifies four other categories of amphibious operation: raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and those in
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of conflict prevention or crisis mitigation (e.g., disaster relief and noncombatant evacuations).2 The last type has constituted the majority of amphibious
operations conducted since World War II. Still, the amphibious assault, as such,
remains most vivid in the mind’s eye. Notwithstanding Omar Bradley’s 1949
declaration that atomic weapons had rendered the large-scale amphibious assault
anachronistic, events of the ensuing decades—famously, Inchon, less than a year
later—suggest that the practical utility of the amphibious operation neither has
dimmed nor is likely to do so in the foreseeable future.3 Its successful execution
still poses the greatest risk to potential and actual enemies, as Argentina learned
through hard experience in 1982, Saddam Hussein recognized during Operation
DESERT STORM, and Task Force (TF) 58 demonstrated to the Taliban in Afghanistan in November 2001. And now the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are returning
their attention to the amphibious assault, after ten years in the desert.4
The present discussion, however, contemplates the amphibious withdrawal,
those “operations conducted to extract forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.”5 The capability to plan and execute amphibious
withdrawals, no less than their more glamorous and practiced assault siblings,
remains a practical essential in the military repertoire. Forces successfully withdrawn and redeployed will live to fight again another day, and the enemy must
honor and plan against such a capability. If the amphibious assault against a
hostile shore is among the most complex, technologically and organizationally, of
all military undertakings, the amphibious withdrawal does the assault one better
—its execution comes as a “branch,” a contingency, against reversal of fortune,
thus as reaction rather than proaction.
History records a great many military situations in which the success or failure
of amphibious withdrawals of land forces profoundly altered operational and
strategic outcomes. Arguably, the inability of Cornwallis in 1781 to extract his
troops at Yorktown led to his surrender and success for the American revolutionaries. Certainly Lord Wellington thoroughly understood the power this capability
afforded him during his Peninsular Campaign against Napoleon’s forces. The
Royal Navy permitted him not only to reinforce by sea at the places and times
required by the ground situation but also to withdraw troops under pressure.
He did so on several occasions, most importantly in January 1809 at Vigo and
Corunna, where nearly thirty thousand British troops were evacuated, thereby
saving Britain’s only field army, as well as perhaps the government and the war.6
A surprising number of major military extractions from the beach, shown in
table 1, were executed in the twentieth century.7 In every event, ground forces
facing destruction by superior enemy strength and position were withdrawn by
naval forces. All these withdrawals were executed without any doctrinal foundation; some without air or sea superiority; most absent purpose-built amphibious
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
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TABLE 1
Month/Year

Location

Actor(s)

Scale

Dec. 1915–Jan. 1916

Gallipoli, Turkey

Britain

140,000 British, Australian, and New
Zealand troops

Dec. 1915–Feb. 1916

Durazzo/San Giovanni, Albania

Serbia,
Italy

136,000 troops, 36,350 horses

May 1940

Dunkirk, France

Britain,
France

338,000 troops

April 1941

Attica and Peloponnesus, Greece

Britain

43,000 troops

Oct. 1941

Odessa

USSR

86,000 troops, 150,000 civilians

Dec. 1941

Hangö, Finland

USSR

20,000+ troops

Feb. 1943

Guadalcanal

Japan

12,000+ troops

Aug. 1943

Sicily, Italy

Germany,
Italy

39,660 German and 62,000 Italian
troops

Aug. 1943

Sardinia, Italy

Germany

25,000 troops, 2,300 vehicles, 5,000 tons

Aug. 1943

Kolombangara, Solomon Islands

Japan

9,000 troops

Sept.–Oct. 1943

Sea of Azov, USSR

Germany,
Romania

200,000 troops, 16,000 wounded,
27,000 civilians, equipment

Sept.–Oct. 1943

Corsica, France

Germany

6,250 troops, 1,200 POWs, 3,000+
vehicles, 5,000 tons

March 1944

Odessa, USSR

Germany

24,300 troops and civilians, 54,000 tons

May 1944

Crimea, USSR

Germany

130,000 German and Romanian troops

March 1945

Courland, Latvia

Germany

2.2 million troops and civilians

Dec. 1950

Wonsan, Korea

United
States

3,800 troops, 1,146 vehicles, 10,000
tons, 4,800 civilians

Dec. 1950

Chinnampo, Korea

United
States

1,800 U.S. troops, 5,900 ROK troops,
3,000 refugees

Dec. 1950

Hungnam, Korea

United
States

105,000 U.S. and ROK troops, 91,000
civilians, 17,500 vehicles, 350,000 tonsa

Dec. 1950–Jan. 1951

Inchon, Korea

United
States

4,963 UN troops, 63,220 ROK troops,
64,200 civilians, 1,404 vehicles, 62,144
tons

a. U.S. Marine and Air Force transport aircraft lifted an additional 3,600 troops, 196 vehicles, and 1,300 tons of cargo from Yongpo Airfield adjacent to
Hungnam.

shipping; some over very short distances, some over long; some by commanders and staffs inexperienced in amphibious techniques; and others were poorly
planned, if at all. In some, the withdrawing force suffered significant casualties in
the process; in most, the bulk of heavy equipment was left behind. In every one,
however, the amphibious withdrawal permitted the commander to retrieve forces
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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otherwise doomed to destruction or captivity and subsequently to reinsert them
into combat. For this alone, the amphibious withdrawal demands our attention.
Dunkirk and Hungnam represent the antipodes of the twentieth-century
amphibious withdrawal. Dunkirk in May 1940 amounted to a hurried evacuation, executed under great pressure from the Luftwaffe, by a hasty assemblage of
British and French naval vessels, augmented by myriad civilian ships and small
craft. The British Expeditionary Force left behind most of its heavy equipment
and arms, as well as about forty thousand British soldiers (along with many more
French). However, the nearly 350,000 troops successfully returned to England,
when recovered, rearmed, and reequipped, once again confronted the Germans
in North Africa and Europe.
Conversely, Hungnam constituted a planned, carefully staged massive redeployment of forces against enemy pressure. Most of General Douglas MacArthur’s
X Corps ground troops—the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and the battered
7th Infantry Division—arrived at and staged off the beach at Hungnam as organized fighting units. In addition, X Corps’s 3rd Infantry Division moved by
road and amphibious lift from Wonsan to Hungnam before being redeployed
south. All these units brought out their fighting equipment and supplies. The
Marines brought their wounded (many others had already been evacuated by
air) and virtually all of their dead down the gauntlet from the Chosen Reservoir.
The Navy immediately treated the wounded and provided the troops with showers and warm food on board ship.8 The Navy also lifted the Republic of Korea
(ROK) I Corps from Songjin to Hungnam, where it was reembarked and lifted
to Bokuko Ko. When the U.S. Navy closed out Hungnam on 24 December 1950,
it destroyed all facilities, leaving behind nothing for advancing enemy forces.
The Navy also redeployed United Nations (UN) forces from Chinnampo and
Inchon on the west coast. Thus, during December 1950, the U.S. Navy conducted
five nearly simultaneous amphibious redeployments from both coasts of Korea.
The total evolution was remarkably well organized and executed; not a single life
was lost to enemy action, and material losses were light.9
Oddly, Hungnam and its associated efforts never worked their way into the
American mythological consciousness—although, justifiably, the 1st Marine Division’s epic fighting withdrawal from Chosen to Hamhung did.10 It was, rather,
the brilliantly conceived and executed landing at Inchon in September 1950—a
masterstroke that reversed the tide of the Korean War—that immediately captured the popular imagination and continues to receive the lion’s share of attention from military historians and the military itself.11
More important, the amphibious withdrawal, generally speaking, has never
worked its way into U.S. doctrine in a meaningful way. Recognizing the requirement for seizing advanced bases in support of War Plan ORANGE, the U.S. Marine
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
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Corps in its 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations laid the intellectual
foundation for the great amphibious assaults of Campaign GRANITE in the Central Pacific, General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific campaign, and the Mediterranean and European campaigns. By war’s conclusion, the amphibious assault,
even of the magnitude and complexity of that planned for the September 1945
invasion of Kyushu, largely had been rendered a well-structured problem.12
Conversely, the Tentative Manual did not contemplate amphibious withdrawals. The Navy’s 1938 Manual for Landing Operations, known as FTP-167, provided doctrinally only for planning and organizing the amphibious assault—ditto
for the Army’s 1941 Landing Operations on Hostile Shores (FM 31-5); both were
derived from the Tentative Manual. As it happened, World War II brought no
such reversals of fortune for U.S. forces. Although it was believed at certain junctures that, the situation being in doubt—notably, in the 1943 operations at Buna
(New Guinea) and Anzio (Italy)—amphibious extraction might be required, in
the event it was not, and no practical experience was gained. The extent to which
narratives of the various World War II withdrawals conducted by other militaries
then penetrated American military consciousness remains unclear, but it cannot
have been very great.
We are only slightly better off today. Joint Publication (JP) 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (its current edition was issued in August 2009),
recognizes and defines amphibious withdrawal but devotes only two pages, out
of more than two hundred, to it.13 The subsidiary 1989 JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine
for Landing Force Operations, last updated in 2004, granted the withdrawal
several more pages, but surprisingly the current (2010) JP 3-02.1, now entitled
Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation, fails even to mention withdrawal—
presumably “embarkation” (an aspect of movement) and “withdrawal” (a form
of maneuver) are to be treated as synonymous.
Perhaps a certain misplaced optimism now makes it difficult to imagine a
future situation in which an amphibious withdrawal might be appropriate. This
would be thin gruel for the commander who confronts the real-world necessity
for such an operation. Consequently, even though now sixty years in the past, the
Hungnam redeployment still warrants our careful consideration. It offers enduring lessons with regard to the problem of amphibious withdrawal; to the process
by which it was conceptualized, planned, and organized; to the practical value
of sea control to the conduct of land operations; and to effective approaches to
solving ill-structured military problems.
KOREA IN 1950
The Korean War was a land war, and yet, because of the theater’s geography and
the state of its communications infrastructure, friendly naval forces played an
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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essential role throughout. The Korean Peninsula, which runs roughly six hundred
miles north to south, has an east-to-west span of mostly less than two hundred
miles, leaving few locations more than a hundred miles from the coast. Its area
totals about eighty-three thousand square miles. The northern part is defended
by high mountains—a long mountain string isolates a major portion of the east
coast—and the west is marked by hills and river drainage basins. In 1950, notwithstanding forty years of Japanese occupation, land communications remained
difficult at best, with few sealed roads or railroads available to negotiate the difficult terrain. These few road and rail lines described more or less an X, with its
intersection at Seoul. Movement north and south, though problematic, was easier
than east and west.
Militarily usable ports, shown on map 1, then comprised, on the west coast,
Chinnampo, Inchon, and Kunsan, dominated by the great tidal range of the shallow Yellow Sea; on the east were Songjin, Hungnam, Wonsan, and Pusan, with
deep water just offshore. Sailing distances from major American naval installations in Japan to Korean ports were short enough to allow quick turnaround;
even Yokosuka, for example, on Japan’s east coast, lay only 655 sea miles from
Pusan. Terrain and hydrography afforded additional opportunity and flexibility
to forces capable of amphibious operations over the beach, as UN forces were.
In short, the factor of space greatly favored the force able to assert and maintain sea and air control, granting it thereby greater freedom of movement and
maneuver than a land-restricted opponent enjoyed. This essential fact had not
escaped General MacArthur, who had learned the lesson during World War II
and subsequently noted, in reference to the Inchon landing, that “deep envelopment, based upon surprise, which severs the enemy’s supply lines is, and always
has been, the decisive maneuver of warfare.”14 The general also properly understood that naval support secured his own lines of supply and provided the ability
to hold necessary beachheads more or less indefinitely.
United Nations forces had promptly established sea and air control in the first
days of the war and effectively exploited it for naval gunfire support, air strikes,
air-to-ground support, and amphibious lifts and assaults. During the first year
of the war North Korea and its Russian and Chinese sponsors made few attempts
at sea denial, but among these, notably, were the extensive sea mining at Wonsan,
the mining of Hungnam harbor, and the sowing of free-floating mines along the
east coast.15 The affected ports would play pivotal roles in the war.
THE ROAD TO HUNGNAM
Against this physical backdrop unfolded the events of the first six months of
the Korean War. North Korean forces attacked across the thirty-eighth parallel
in the small hours of Sunday, 25 June 1950. Four days later, General Douglas
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
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MAP 1

Field, History of United States Naval Operations.
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MacArthur, Commander, Far East Command, personally visited the active front
just south of Seoul and concluded that U.S. naval and air support would be insufficient by themselves to stop the invaders, who were already sweeping aside the
South Korean defenders. Absent immediate employment of U.S. ground troops,
the North Koreans would surely overrun the entire peninsula. Piecemeal insertion of small U.S. units by airlift was succeeded by disparate small sealifts from
Japan as MacArthur sought to buy time in order to mount an amphibious operation that would lay bare the North Koreans’ lines of communications and enable
their forces’ envelopment and destruction. Events moved rapidly, however: the
forces initially designated for a July assault at Inchon landed instead, on 17 July,
at Pohang Dong, in order to reinforce the fragile Pusan perimeter—enabled by
friendly sea and air control.
That perimeter held, and with the heroic deployment of the 1st Marine Division, speedy assembly of the requisite amphibious shipping over the next two
months, and organization of X Corps, the general realized his operational vision
with the 15 September Inchon landing. Although follow-on land operations
failed to envelop and destroy the North Koreans as intended, the latter’s offensive
largely culminated, and, mostly no longer fighting in large, organized units, they
fled north, pursued by Eighth Army units from the Pusan perimeter.
A second X Corps amphibious landing, this time on the east coast at Wonsan,
aimed to cut off and complete the destruction of the invaders. Unfortunately, the
Soviets had anticipated such an assault and had covertly commenced extensive
mining in late July, the clearance of which delayed landing X Corps, reembarked
after Inchon. The 1st Marine Division did not land until 26 October, while the
7th Infantry Division landed instead farther north, at Iwon. By that time the
ground war had already largely passed north of Wonsan, although guerrilla activity plagued the mountainous areas just inland.
Meanwhile, an early October United Nations resolution had expanded the
strategic objective from simply destroying the North Korean army and restoring
South Korea’s integrity to pacifying North Korea, which for the moment seemed
entirely possible. The X Corps commander, Major General “Ned” Almond, repeatedly urged his subordinate ground commanders to move faster toward the
northern reaches of Korea in the mountains adjacent to the Yalu River, which
they did, as did their Eighth Army counterparts in Korea’s west. Almond established his headquarters at Hamhung; the Navy cleared and opened the port at
Hungnam for its support.
The Chinese had other ideas, however. Feeling threatened by the looming presence of United Nations forces near their border, beginning in late October they
had secretly started moving vast numbers of ground troops into the mountains
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of northern Korea. American forces took Chinese prisoners almost immediately.
However, ambiguity initially obtained as to whether these were individual volunteers or from organized units. All doubt disappeared on 7 November, when
the 1st Marine Division was hit hard by sizable Chinese units. Nonetheless, each
succeeding estimate of Chinese strength was obsolete by the time it was published: 16,500 on 2 November; 100,000 a week later; 145,000 on the 15th; a range
of 142,000 to 167,000 on the 23rd.16 In fact, the Chinese had moved across the
border in even greater numbers than those, and it was now an entirely new war.
On 15 November, in concert with an all-out air effort against the Yalu River
bridges, MacArthur ordered X Corps to redirect its efforts to the west to assist
Eighth Army; the Marines were to attack west against the enemy’s line of supply
—apparently on the assumption that they would meet little resistance—while
other X Corps units moved north along the east coast. On 24 November, having
opened Chinnampo for naval logistic support, and supported by Fifth Air Force,
Eighth Army units attacked north from the Chongchon River—II Corps on the
left, IX Corps in the middle, and the ROK II Corps on the right—with orders to
link up with X Corps. Shortly, however, Chinese forces counterattacked heavily
against the ROK II Corps, which broke, exposing the IX Corps right flank. The
5th and 7th Marine Regiments, by this time nearing the Chosen Reservoir, met
heavy opposition and on the 27th were struck by two Chinese divisions.
“NO, GENERAL, WE DON’T KNOW HOW TO DO THAT”
The stage was now set for Eighth Army to commence its hasty retrograde movement in the west, while the Marines and fellow X Corps units were to begin their
fighting withdrawal back to Hungnam.17 Meanwhile, what of the Navy, which
was cast in a supporting role to the land forces and might very well have to pull
them all off the beach?
Within a week of the 7 November Chinese attack against the Marines, Vice
Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval Forces Far East, had published his
Operation Plan 116-50, outlining general procedures for emergency evacuation
of UN forces from Korea to Japan. It included hydrographic data on Korean
ports, along with capabilities of available shipping, and it established command
relations for the redeployment. On 15 November, the commanding general of 1st
Marine Division, General Oliver P. Smith, conveyed his serious concern about the
ground situation to the chiefs of staff of Vice Admiral Joy and of Rear Admiral
James H. Doyle, commander of Amphibious Force, Far East, reinforcing the need
for contingency plans. Joy, at the prescient recommendation of his deputy chief
of staff, Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke (who had arrived in Japan in late August),
began accumulating time-charter shipping in Japan rather than releasing it for
return to the United States.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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As was well known, and had just been proved once again in Korea, the U.S.
Navy, Marine Corps, and Army were well prepared to make amphibious assaults.
But they were not so well prepared for extractions. Although veteran amphibious
professionals all, the commanders and their staffs on the scene in Korea had neither previous directly comparable practical experience nor specifically applicable
doctrine to guide their thinking and decision making for Hungnam. Where the
assault had been rendered a well-structured one by World War II experience, the
withdrawal remained ill structured.
“Ill structured” problems are distinguished from “well structured” ones by
the degree to which their boundaries, constituent parts, and the relationships
among those parts are understood. That is, “ill” and “well structured” refer to the
fidelity of the decision maker’s representation of the problem to the existential
problem itself. Well-structured problems are readily recognizable and assignable to discrete categories and are therefore directly susceptible of solution by
computational means—that is, by selection and application of courses of action
from existing solution sets. The pre–World War II Tentative Manual for Landing Operations had begun the practical structuring of the amphibious assault,
which was understood to be necessary for acquiring the forward operating bases
required for the anticipated Pacific campaign against Japan; forces required,
phases, timing, sequencing, and synchronization were all roughed out. Careful
assessments of initial wartime amphibious experience refined that structuring:
shipping requirements, command relations, prelanding bombardment, coordination of close air support, and hydrographic intelligence were all adjusted. The
organization of boats for ship-to-shore movement was carefully reworked. By the
time of the June 1944 Marianas operations, the problems had been so thoroughly
structured that the plans were confidently executed against more or less alerted
opposition.
Conversely, ill-structured problems require decision makers to impose structures on them and to generate solutions for them—often at the same time. Typically, ill-structured problems are those that have not been encountered previously
in quite the same forms and for which no predetermined, explicit sets of ordered
responses (i.e., doctrines) exist.18 In war, it may be said, each opponent attempts
to present the other with enough surprise that the problem posed cannot be structured and made solvable in the time and with the forces available.
Thus, Japan’s systematic employment of thousands of kamikazes and hundreds of Shinyo and Renrakutai surface suicide boats against U.S. naval forces at
Okinawa for a time rendered ill structured the problem of force protection. The
practical challenge was simultaneously to figure out the structure of these threats
and to devise effective methods for dealing with them.19 Out of 1,300 ships involved at Okinawa, assaulted in the teeth of that dual challenge, the “Fleet That
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
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Came to Stay” sustained thirty-six ships sunk and another 368 damaged, with
more than 4,900 sailors killed.20
Neither do ill-structured problems remain constant while decision makers
seek to impose structure on them. Their components and their interrelationships
often change in a very short time frame, rendering initial efforts to understand
them obsolete—especially in war, which we understand as a complex interactive system. This was the case in November–December 1950 in Korea. Both the
operational situation and understanding of that situation changed rapidly. The
Navy’s practical challenge was to ascertain what rapidly changing conditions on
the ground and successive decisions by MacArthur and his principal ground
commanders would demand of it for support.21
The learning curve for ill-structured problems is generally very steep, and trial
and error constitute the main mechanism for generating information and reducing uncertainty about the problem—that is, converting it into a well-structured
one. Notably, the centralized, hierarchical organization structures effective for
well-structured problems do not fit ill-structured ones, which are more readily
addressed by decentralized, self-organizing systems, within which discretion resides at many points. Such systems allow experts to exercise their best judgment,
adjusting as required, while achieving unity of effort principally through lateral
communications.22 Even then, the most that can be attained in real time is to render such problems well structured in the small, while the larger problem remains
ill structured.23 The structure of the overall problem will likely only be known in
retrospect, after its attempted solution.
Although no name for the concept had yet been coined, Rear Admiral Doyle
implicitly grasped the challenges posed by an ill-structured problem and the relationship between type of problem and the command-and-control (C2, in today’s
shorthand) relations that would be appropriate. He proceeded accordingly.
Doyle realized that the unprecedented character of the potential problem
of extracting large numbers of troops and amounts of equipment from widely
separated hostile beaches on two coasts dictated against a programmed, standard
C2 structure below. As Commander, Task Force (CTF) 90, he had at his disposal
Amphibious Groups 1 and 3. Facing the prospect of simultaneous retrograde
movements by Eighth Army on the west coast and by X Corps on the east, Doyle
retained overall command of the redeployments but directed Amphibious Group
3, under Rear Admiral Lyman Thackrey, to attend to Eighth Army at Chinnampo
and Inchon, leaving Amphibious Group 1, under his direct command, to support
X Corps at Songjin, Wonsan, and Hungnam.
At MacArthur’s request, Amphibious Group 1, under Doyle, had arrived in
Japan in early June 1950 to train Eighth Army in battalion-level amphibious operations. The day North Korea attacked, it was conducting a landing exercise at
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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Sagami Wan. Initially little more than a token training unit, during the months
preceding Hungnam the group grew many times over to become a full-fledged
amphibious force.
Doyle was a distinguished veteran amphibious officer, arguably the most
amphibiously experienced serving senior officer. He had been Admiral R. Kelly
Turner’s operations officer at Guadalcanal, 1942–43, and had then served in
Admiral Ernest King’s Commander in Chief Amphibious Section, 1943–45,
including work on the Joint Amphibious Warfare Committee. In early 1948 he
had assumed command of the Amphibious Training Command at Coronado,
California; in January 1950 he reported as Commander, Amphibious Group 1.
Officers with extensive World War II amphibious experience populated
Doyle’s staff. They were overqualified and technically too senior for their billets—
the fortuitous result of a difficult civilian economy and a greatly drawn-down
Navy. They knew in detail the intricacies of amphibious planning. They were
used to working together, having experienced little turnover in the preceding
two years, and had planned and executed three major amphibious exercises in
the spring of 1950, followed by the three major Korean amphibious operations.
The admiral knew his staff, its members knew each other, and all had developed
effective working relationships.
Doyle, in his capacity as CTF 90, had a second capable amphibious force in
Thackrey’s Amphibious Group 3. It had arrived in Korea shortly following Inchon. Thackrey had run that port’s operations after its capture and in October
landed the Army’s 7th Division at Iwon.
Mobile Training Team Able of the Amphibious Training Command’s Troop
Training Unit had embarked with Amphibious Group 1 when it went to Japan.
Commanded by Colonel Edward H. Forney, USMC, Team Able’s officers and
men had worked together for some time and were personally known to Doyle.
Team Able had been integral to all three previous amphibious operations. Doyle
had seconded the unit to the 1st Cavalry Division (which lacked amphibiousexperienced personnel) to plan that division’s part in the Pohang Dong landing.
Doyle then placed the unit on a similar temporary assignment with X Corps for
the Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon operations; Forney served as the corps’s deputy
chief of staff. He and his men did the bulk of that command’s amphibious planning for those operations.24 Thus, Team Able and Amphibious Group 1’s staffs
were no strangers to each other; neither were Team Able and X Corps staffs
strangers. Doyle later commented that Forney “could get along with anyone—
and without compromising himself. This facility proved invaluable, for the corps
commander [Almond] was at best prickly, at worst arrogant and overbearing.”25
Conversely, Doyle and Major General Smith had quickly developed a close and
mutually respectful relationship in planning and executing the Inchon and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
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Wonsan-Iwon operations, which was mirrored in the effective working relationships between their staffs (Smith and most of his staff had sailed on board Doyle’s
flagship for both operations).
Secure in the knowledge that they were seasoned professionals who had
learned their craft not in peacetime training but in the hard schools of the Southwest and Central Pacific, Mediterranean, and European campaigns of World War
II, Doyle, as we shall see shortly, would grant his subordinates considerable independence to make such arrangements for the Hungnam redeployment as their
professional experience suggested were appropriate. The several elements were
then to coordinate as required to achieve unity of effort through direct lateral
communication.
Doyle understood that effectively addressing the problem of amphibious
withdrawal also required that he be afforded by his own superiors considerable
leeway in the exercise of command. Shortly after October 1950’s Wonsan-Iwon
operation, Doyle plainly told his “old and very close friend” Vice Admiral Joy
that he could not and would not come under the Seventh Fleet commander, Vice
Admiral Arthur D. Struble, in any future operation. (Figure 1 shows the Naval
Forces Far East command organization obtaining in November 1950.) Doyle’s
conflict with Struble, eight years his senior, no doubt had roots in personalities,
and perhaps in competition for credit, but it extended well beyond into profound
differences in professional philosophy and practice.26
For Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon, Doyle had reported directly to Struble. During these operations, Doyle felt, Struble had regularly interfered in his exercise
of command. Consequently, judging that he needed Doyle’s expertise more than
Struble’s, Joy issued on 13 November a preliminary plan for evacuation of UN
forces from Korea that established a naval task organization as shown in figure
2. It had Doyle reporting directly to him, while granting Doyle considerable discretion and unusually wide-ranging responsibilities, not only for the redeployment itself but for shipping protection, control of air support and naval gunfire
support in the embarkation areas, and maintenance of the blockade along the
Korean east coast. Joy directed Struble to provide support to Doyle.27 At the same
time, this unusual arrangement allowed Struble freedom of maneuver and the
ability to address whatever threats the Soviets and Chinese might pose from the
sea, either to Doyle’s operations or, in the worst case, to Formosa or Japan.
Subsequently, however, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Forrest Sherman—who believed Hungnam carried potential for great disaster—
intervened. He did not want an amphibious commander to control the fast carriers. He was also well aware of continuing friction between Struble (who was his
protégé) and Doyle. Sherman had previously weighed in with Joy after July 1950’s
Pohang Dong landing, and as a result the command relations that had obtained
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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for both Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon had been those acceptable to Struble (but
not to Doyle). For his part, Doyle believed that “Sherman knew little, if anything,
about amphibious operations”; of his own relationship with the CNO, he later
commented, “We never were mutual admirers.”28
Sherman directed Admiral Arthur Radford, Commander, Pacific Fleet, to give
Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commander, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, verbal orders (of which Joy was ultimately made aware) to go to Korea (his
fifth trip there) and assume command at Hungnam if, in his judgment, Doyle was
not executing effectively. Doyle learned of Shepherd’s orders only years later.29
Major General Smith knew only that Shepherd was the CNO’s representative at
Hungnam.30
In the end, however, Joy’s C2 structure stood, with its great leeway granted
Doyle to organize and execute the redeployment operations, as well as the forces
requisite to the job—amphibious shipping, naval gunfire ships, escort-carrierbased aircraft, and Marine ground-based air. Doyle coordinated additional air
and naval gunfire support with Struble as needed. Although the Air Force did
not contribute air-to-ground support to X Corps, it provided night “heckler”
coverage, and its transports proved essential for evacuating the wounded from
Chosen Reservoir.31
FIGURE 1
NAVAL OPERATING COMMANDS, KOREA—NOVEMBER 1950
COMNAVFE
COMNAVFORJAP
CTF 96
VADM C. T. Joy

Task Force 95
UN Blockading and Escort Force
RADM A. E. Smith

Seventh Fleet
VADM A. D. Struble

Task Force 77
Striking Force
Task Force 79
Service Squadron 3
Task Force 72
Formosa Patrol
Task Group 70.6
Fleet Air Wing 1

Task Force 90
PhibFor FE
RADM J. H. Doyle

TG 96.1 Fleet Activities Japan–Korea
TG 96.2 Fleet Air Japan
TG 96.3 SCAJAP
TG 96.4 Service Group
TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group
TG 96.9 Submarine Group

TG 95.1 West Coast Group
TG 95.2 East Coast Group
TE 95.21 East Coast Element 1
TE 95.22 East Coast Element 2
TG 95.6 Minesweeping Group
TG 95.7 ROK Navy
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FIGURE 2
NAVAL TASK ORGANIZATION FOR HUNGNAM—DECEMBER 1950
COMNAVFE/CTF 96
VADM C. T. Joy

Task Force 90
RADM J. H. Doyle

Seventh Fleet
VADM A. D. Struble

TE 90.00 Flagship Element CAPT C. A. Printup
1 AGC

TF 77 Fast Carrier Force
RADM E. C. Ewen

TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Element
CDR R. W. Arudt
TACRON 1

TG 77.1 Support Group
CAPT I. T. Duke
1 BB, 1 CL, 1 CLAA

TE 90.02 Repair/Salvage Element CDR L. C. Conwell
1 ARG, 1 ARL, 2 ARS, 1 ATF

TG 77.2 Screening Group
CAPT J. R. Clark
17–22 DD

TE 90.03 Control Element LCDR C. E. Allmon
2 APD, 1 PCEC
TG 90.2 Transport Group CAPT S. G. Kelly
TE 90.21 Transport Element CAPT A. E. Jarrell
3 APA, 3 AKA, 2 APD, 1 PCEC, 3 LSD (W/9 LSU),
11 LST, 27 SCAJAP LST, MSTS shipping assigned
TG 90.8 Gunfire Support Group
RADM R. H. Hillenkoetter
1 CA, 4 DD, 3 LSMR, plus 1 CA, 1 DD from TG 95.2

TG 77.3 Carrier Group
RADM E. C. Ewen
3–4 CV
TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group
RADM R. W. Ruble
1–2 CVE, 0–1 CVL, 3–8 DD
TG 79.2 Logistic Support Group
CAPT B. L. Austin
Units assigned from Service
Squadron 3 and Service Division 31

TG 95.2 Blockade, Escort and Minesweeping Group
RADM J. M. Higgins
1 CA, 4 DD, 6 PF, plus DMS, AM, AMS from TG 95.6

ACCELERATING EVENTS ON THE GROUND
On 28 November Joy alerted Doyle to the high probability of major evacuation
operations. Doyle immediately commenced planning for “redeployment by water
of own and friendly troops in Korea either as an administrative ‘outloading’ or
a general emergency based on Joy’s OpPlan 116-50.” Joy advised Doyle to put
his ships, then still in Japan, on six-hour notice for movement to Korea. Doyle
in turn directed his ships to assemble in Sasebo (a short 165 miles from Pusan)
and issued Operation Order 19-50 for planning purposes. His basic plan was for
Amphibious Group 3 to conduct west-coast operations and Amphibious Group 1
east-coast operations, while overall responsibility remained with Doyle as Commander, Task Force 90.
On 30 November, MacArthur directed X Corps to concentrate in the Hamhung–
Hungnam area, while Eighth Army retired southward to Pyongyang and Seoul.
Doyle now placed all ships in port on two-hour notice, and Amphibious Group 3
departed Japan for Inchon. However, Eighth Army’s rapid southward movement
had already uncovered Chinnampo, necessitating redirection of the group to that
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port. Late on 3 December the transport group steamed up the eighty-four-mile
swept channel to Chinnampo, on the assumption that an evacuation was imminent but without specifics on troops and equipment to be extracted, the tactical
situation, or even who was to command the operation.
Fortunately, Thackrey discovered that shipping already in place at Chinnampo was adequate to requirements. He had extracted 1,800 Army and Navy
port personnel and 5,900 ROK troops, along with civilian refugees who showed
up unannounced, by late 4 December.32 At Inchon, from 7 December to 5 January, when the port was closed and destroyed even as Chinese troops entered the
city, Thackrey outloaded 4,693 UN and 63,220 Korean military personnel, 1,404
vehicles, and 62,144 tons of cargo, along with 64,200 Korean civilians, all subsequently landed at Pusan.33
For the moment, it remained unclear whether United Nations forces would
have to withdraw entirely from Korea to Japan or could and would maintain
lodgments at Pusan and Hungnam throughout the winter. However, on 1 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed MacArthur to withdraw X Corps and
“coordinate” that movement with Eighth Army, which was to hold its position
across the waist of Korea. On 7 December high-level discussions in Tokyo modified that plan to have Eighth Army hold Seoul until it became necessary to retire
upon Pusan.34 The following day, when the senior Navy and Marine commanders
conferred on board Doyle’s flagship, they still had to consider two possibilities:
that of establishing and maintaining a lodgment at Hungnam and the more likely
one of withdrawal. Fortunately, the next day the Joint Chiefs approved the revised
plan, and the decision was made to redeploy south.
Such fluidity does not conduce to easy operational planning, but Doyle and
his staff met the challenge, having preliminary plans already in hand both for defending a perimeter at Hungnam and for withdrawing from that port, as well as
from other east- and west-coast ports. Now they knew they would be executing a
withdrawal: “Troops and supplies that had reached the theater through three ports
and troops that had arrived overland now had to be funneled out through a single
harbor; personnel and gear that had come in over a period of two months were to
be removed in the space of two weeks.”35 At the same time, the amphibious forces
had to continue unloading supplies required by the withdrawing troops and those
supplies necessary to the defense of the perimeter around Hungnam.
Doyle and his staff initially made the analogy between the operant conditions
of the redeployment problem and an “amphibious landing in reverse.” Suppose
one filmed an amphibious assault and then ran it backward—what would the
operation look like? It proved an apt connection and provided the starting point
(but only that) for imposing a structure on the problem and devising a course of
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action for its solution. Doyle decided that excess supplies and supporting troops
would embark first; thereafter, as the beachhead shrank with the embarkation of
combat forces, naval gunfire and air support would ensure that there was no diminution of combat power ashore. At the conclusion, naval bombardment would
be the only force “ashore.”36 Doyle had previously commenced mine clearance at
Hungnam to expand the safe anchorage area, provide an expanded safe channel
from the anchorage to seaward, and establish channels for gunfire-support ships.
On 1 December X Corps reported that 3rd Infantry Division at Wonsan was
under heavy enemy pressure and that road and rail lines between there and
Hungnam had been cut, and it requested an amphibious redeployment of the
division. Doyle decided to conduct this initial evacuation as a small-scale test
of his tentative plans and procedures for Hungnam. It would illuminate the
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed staged reduction of the defense perimeter around the Hungnam harbor—in effect, telling him whether or not he
had gotten about right the structure of the problem. In the event, at Wonsan the
evacuation plan was simple and direct. The troops ashore described around the city
an arc whose radius they progressively reduced as supplies and personnel within the
beachhead loaded and left. The fire support ships isolated Wonsan by shellfire, fired
any observed missions [i.e., spotted by controllers, in observation aircraft] requested,
and at night provided random harassing and interdiction fires on pre-selected targets
and fired star shells for battlefield illumination.37

Fortunately, it was already clear when Doyle arrived at Wonsan on 4 December
that there was no significant enemy pressure and that all but the rear elements of
3rd Division had already moved by road to Hungnam. Consequently, he revised
lift requirements downward. Ultimately, 3,800 3rd Division troops, seven thousand refugees, 1,146 vehicles, and ten thousand tons of cargo outloaded by ship
from Wonsan from 3 to 5 December.
The experiment validated Doyle’s initial hypothesis, and his staff began preparing detailed plans for Hungnam based on lessons learned there. Subordinate
units proceeded simultaneously in their own planning, communicating continually with Doyle and his staff, who remained on board his flagship, USS Mount
McKinley (AGC 7), anchored in Hungnam harbor. On 6 December, Doyle sent a
small force from Wonsan to lift ROK I Corps from Songjin to Hungnam. Operations at Songjin closed out on 10 December.
ORGANIZATION AT HUNGNAM
As map 2 indicates, Hungnam was well suited to serve as the principal port for
the redeployment. As one historian describes it, the
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city of Hungnam, manufacturing center as well as seaport, lies in the northwestern
corner of the Korean Gulf near the delta of the Songchon River. Although Hamhung,
its inland satellite, is an important road and railway center, Hungnam is the larger of
the two, with a population in 1950 a third again that of Wonsan. The bay on which
the city lies is open to the south, but the inner harbor is protected by a 2,200-foot
wharf with four fathoms of water and by a breakwater. Other smaller wharves existed, as did heavy loading equipment, developed to handle the products of the city’s
chemical industry. As at Wonsan, a 100-fathom curve runs 30 miles offshore and the
approaches are easily mined.38

In addition to the inner port facilities, shown in map 3, which would allow effective employment of standard cargo and transport shipping, Hungnam possesses beaches immediately adjacent to the port, shown in map 4, that were entirely
suitable in their hydrography for beaching amphibious shipping and were readily
defensible within the planned perimeter. Nearby Yongpo Airfield (see maps 2 and
4) served as the primary base for the 1st Marine Air Wing, which was to provide a
major portion of the close air support and combat air patrol. Equally important,
X Corps headquarters had been established and remained at Hamhung, facilitating easy communication between the ground commander and the amphibious
commander and their staffs.39 Moreover, in order to facilitate the logistic support
MAP 2

Field, History of United States Naval Operations.
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of X Corps, beginning on 7 November the Navy had addressed the Soviet-laid
mines at Hungnam, declaring the port open four days later. Thus, the port was
well located, suitable to the endeavor, and for Doyle a known quantity.
The amphibious group staff held an operations planning conference on board
Mount McKinley on loading and ship control on the afternoon of 9 December,
followed by another planning conference ashore with representatives of X Corps
and the Army 2nd Engineer Special Brigade. Firm plans for loading were made
during a final staff conference that night and were approved by Doyle. The Control and Loading Plan, based on a staff study of the harbor’s physical capabilities,
established a series of control posts, for which a special task organization was
formed. Doyle assigned to each control station the most able and experienced
officer and enlisted personnel available from the staffs of CTF 90; the Military Sea
Transportation Service (MSTS), Hungnam; Fleet Activities, Hungnam; and other
naval units. “The general experience and ‘know how’ of all hands was utilized to
the utmost as no one present [had] previous actual experience with an operation
of this type.”40
The CTF 90 operations section (on board Mount McKinley) constituted one
of the control stations; it coordinated all ship movements, assigned anchorages,
issued docking instructions, and prepared and issued sailing orders for all Navy
and SCAJAP (Shipping Control Authority, Japan) shipping.41 It also supervised
operations of all other control stations. MSTS activities at Hungnam were integrated with the operations section on the flagship, with responsibility for all
MSTS shipping engaged in the operation. Physical colocation facilitated easy,
close, and clear communication between the two entities.
A radio-equipped harbor-control vessel stationed in the port managed shipping, twenty-four hours a day. An officer boarded each MSTS-operated ship immediately on its arrival to assess its load status, capacity, amount and condition
of loading equipment, and any peculiarities relevant to loading. This information
went to CTF 90 Operations by radio. All such ships were directed to be ready for
movement on immediate, two-hour, or later notice as required.
On 9 December a X Corps embarkation control group was established to
provide overall Army supervision of corps loading, with a control officer, an
executive officer, representatives from each of the corps’s technical services, and
the CTF 90 staff combat cargo officer as liaison officer. Transient members, as
required, included embarkation control groups from 1st Marine Division, 7th
Division, 3rd Division, and ROK I Corps. As during the Inchon and WonsanIwon landings, Colonel Forney’s Marines did the actual planning for X Corps.
Forney himself served as the shore-based control and loading officer, performing with “consummate skill.” Set up in a shed on the docks, Forney assigned his
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MAP 3

U.S. Navy

officers and enlisted personnel to key positions in this control station, “where
their four months on the X Corps staff resulted in excellent relationships.” Doyle
found that General Almond “cooperated fully and ensured that his subordinates
followed his example. He established X Corps embarkation priority as personnel,
[then] vehicles, [then] equipment, supplies, and refugees. But he never objected to
departures from that order, knowing that we had good reason when we did so.”42
Forney and his staff “selected the X Corps units to be loaded on the basis
of available tactical and administrative information and assigned shipping in
consultation with the operations section of TF 90. Port operating units were
then advised of dockside requirements, the loading section ground out its plans,
the movement section got the traffic down to the water, and the rations people
laid down these useful items alongside.”43 This control group maintained nearly
constant direct telephone communication with all relevant units and CTF 90
Operations.
Each corps unit provided its embarkation control group with a “readiness for
loading” report (covering personnel, vehicles, and bulk cargo, etc.) prior to its
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
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time to commence loading as promulgated in the master schedule, which hinged
on the tactical situation. X Corps broke the report data into shipping requirements, as advised by the combat cargo officer. CTF 90 Operations assigned suitable shipping, on the basis of these requirements and available berths. The embarkation control group was provided the identities of the ships assigned, along
with data on their capacity, booms, etc., and planned a “paper load.” Shortages
and overages of shipping space were immediately reported to CTF 90 Operations,
and the embarkation control group adjusted plans as necessary.
The port director maintained operational control of actual docking and undocking of all ships and of the movement of all shipping in the inner harbor.
Three qualified CTF 90 staff officers were assigned to Port Director Control. A
radio-equipped landing craft assigned to the port director (and shared with the
beachmaster, described below) served as a dispatch boat. Ships moored at one of
seven berthing spaces alongside four docks. Experimentation quickly led to procedures for the most efficient use of these limited spaces (including, importantly,
double-banking ships at the docks). Two radio-equipped Army yard tugs made
it possible to dock and undock ships rapidly.44
CTF 90 Operations advised the port director that a given ship was to be
docked at a given berth as a replacement for the ship there, then directed it to
proceed from its anchorage and wait in the vicinity of the breakwater for a pilot,
who docked the ship. Doyle and his staff contrived so to “time the process that
the new ship reached her berth at the same time the first troops and supplies to
be loaded came alongside,” and they usually met that goal.45 The embarkation
control liaison officer advised CTF 90 Operations of the time a given ship would
finish loading, and the latter assigned it a “chop time” that was given to the port
director. At that time the ship was undocked and got under way.
The Beachmaster Control Unit controlled beaching and retracting all tank
landing ships (LSTs) in the LST beaching area (Green Beaches 1 and 2; see map
4), a function analogous to that of the port director. An MSTS officer with a
great deal of previous LST experience, assigned as beachmaster, piloted most of
the SCAJAP LSTs onto the beach (where they would open their bow doors, drop
a ramp, and “onload” vehicles and cargo directly, backing off the beach, with the
help of an anchor dropped astern, when ready). The beaching area could handle
eleven LSTs simultaneously; additionally, three LSTs could be berthed at Dock
No. 4 when the Green Beaches were full, or immediately adjacent to that dock
at Blue Beach. CTF 90 Operations delivered sailing orders to each LST before it
was loaded. Once the Shore Party (below) notified the beachmaster that an LST
was loaded, the latter forwarded that information to the CTF 90 liaison officer
at X Corps headquarters by radio. The liaison officer then obtained final clearance for sailing and in turn informed the beachmaster, who directed the LST to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
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Hundreds of aviation gasoline drums await evacuation on the Hungnam docks, 14 December 1950. USS LST-898 is in the center, with a LCU at right and the
harbor entrance control frigate (PF) in the background. View looking northeast from Blue Beach across the inner harbor.
U.S. Navy

execute its sailing orders (and assisted, with boats, in its retraction from the beach
if required). Additional assistance was provided by a SCAJAP headquarters staff
officer temporarily assigned to CTF 90 Operations.
A control officer and small staff (on board the Control Ship) directed movement of all utility landing ships (LSUs) and smaller craft in the inner harbor. The
control officer also assisted in directing movements of the LSTs, in coordination
with the beachmaster and the port director. This was a busy station, twenty-four
hours a day.
Doyle assigned his staff civil engineer to the Army 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, which served as the Shore Party—responsible for physical aspects of the
loading. The civil engineer liaison officer advised the brigade in order to expedite
loading and kept CTF 90 Operations informed of loading progress in real time.
Doyle later commented that this “Liaison Officer solved any problems which
arose and was extremely valuable as an ‘expediter’ who had direct contact with all
Army and Navy Control Stations connected with the operation.”46
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A truck convoy moves along a beach road to the evacuation beach, 18 December 1950. Two Japanese-manned LSTs and USS LSM-419 are loading.
U.S. Navy

Each control element worked independently on those matters that it could
handle without reference to the other elements and coordinated with the others
when required. However, given the extremely compressed time frame, the discretion Doyle granted his subordinates would have been for naught absent a simple,
effective, real-time communications system: the admiral believed that “the most
important factor in the operation of the control organization was the establishment of special primary and secondary very-high-frequency voice radio circuits
directly connecting Control Stations.” All stations used the primary circuit except
the station manned by the CTF 90 liaison officer at the X Corps embarkation
control group, who had near-exclusive use of the secondary circuit. Ultimately,
however, both circuits were used whenever necessary due to difficulties in communication. A simple numerical code was employed to identify ships easily and
still maintain security.
Qualified operators served on each station on both circuits, but in order to
eliminate delay or misunderstanding in operational traffic, “all except routine
messages of minor importance were transmitted by the officers concerned speaking
directly to each other.”47 Officers spoke directly to other officers and therefore
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
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Amphibious shipping beached at Hungnam during the evacuation, December 1950. LCUs present include LCU-520, LCU-638, LCU-742, & LCU-783.
U.S. Navy

solved problems, kept everyone concerned informed, made or obtained decisions rapidly, and issued orders in the most efficient manner possible under the
circumstances.
In the harbor, CTF 90 Operations primarily used visual signals (flag hoist and
flashing light) to handle administrative traffic and to communicate with MSTS
ships present. During 7–24 December, Mount McKinley’s signal bridge handled
1,124 outgoing and 1,104 incoming dispatches. Overall, 44,750 dispatches were
handled on the flagship during the period, including 24,630 on the tactical circuits and 17,982 in Radio One (the ship’s “radio shack”). Such communications
arrangements permitted ready adjustment and adaptation as circumstances
changed and as new, unanticipated problems arose. At the same time, individual
control posts were not overburdened with information they did not require to
conduct their activities.
“WALK, DON’T RUN TO THE NEAREST EXIT”
Because the outloading could function smoothly without Doyle’s direct supervision, he was able to focus on “preventing the enemy from establishing itself close
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enough to our troops to cause casualties. To that end [he] used air attacks and
naval gunfire to maintain the necessary separation. Basically, [he] put in front of
the U.N. units a zone of fire through which the enemy could not pass.”48
Doyle directly controlled the naval gunfire support element. From 7 to 15 December he stationed ships of this element where, as shown on map 2, they could
simultaneously deliver emergency “call fire” (that is, requested by troops without
notice) for X Corps and defend local shipping against enemy air attack. On 15
December, stationed in the assigned mineswept channels (extending ten miles
north and south of Hungnam), the ships of the element began deep-support
fires (while X Corps artillery provided close support)—principally eight-inch
interdiction and harassing fires and five-inch illumination rounds (enemy
forces tended to press on friendly lines at night). As the perimeter contracted,
the gunfire support ships moved to closer stations as required for direct troop
support. Both observation and fighter aircraft located targets of opportunity and
supplemented ground observation. Missouri (BB 63) arrived at Hungnam on 24
December to provide additional fire.49
The 1st Marine Air Wing at Yongpo Airfield (see maps 2 and 4) provided air
support during the initial phase of the operation. It controlled all air support
(including carrier-based) and served as the tactical air control center until 15
December, when Yongpo was uncovered by the contracting perimeter and it was
flown out. The center moved to Mount McKinley, and CTF 90 assumed control
of all air support within a thirty-five-mile radius of Hungnam, including TF 77
aircraft and Task Group (TG) 96.8 escort carrier aircraft, night hecklers from the
Air Force and TF 77, and all reconnaissance and transient aircraft (see figure 2).
Throughout, Marine pilots in observation aircraft provided forward air control
—they “understood the requirements of the troops and the capabilities of the
covering aircraft and their armament loads.”50 Detachments from the Marine Air
and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) served with X Corps Army
units to maintain radio contact with the forward air controllers, supporting aircraft, and naval gunfire ships—the “ANGLICO’s had the expertise necessary to
call for and control the available support.”51 At sea, under TF 77, there were never
fewer than four Essex-class carriers to provide air support, coordinated by CTF
90 Operations with CTF 77, as for the July 1950 Pohang Dong landing. Doyle
handled air and naval gunfire communications in the manner prescribed for assault amphibious operations.
Doyle also shifted from shore-based to seaborne logistics, using floating petroleum and ammunition dumps, along with an evacuation center and a prisonerof-war camp afloat. He ordered life jackets and debarkation ladders. He directed
Thackrey to send all available attack transports and attack cargo ships (along with
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one dock landing ship, or LSD) from Inchon to Hungnam and requested that Joy
provide ten empty cargo ships daily at Hungnam until further notice.52
Doyle published his loading and control plan for Hungnam on 11 December.
He issued Operation Order 20-50 on 13 December, incorporating his Operation
Order 19-50 and consolidating previous dispatches. Plans for gunfire support
and air support were finalized in coordination with the TF 77 operations officer, X Corps, and Commander, Cruiser Division 1.53 Operations would proceed
twenty-four hours per day.
That same day, Doyle assumed direct command of Hungnam port functions
and commenced loading X Corps personnel, vehicles, and supplies. General Almond had proposed that the 1st Marine Division provide security for the operation. However, because the Marines had already borne the hardest fighting, Doyle
insisted that they load first, while the 3rd Division supplied security, with the 7th
Division taking over portions of the perimeter until the ROK I Corps cleared the
port; then the last U.S. division would embark.54
The operation continued to present surprises. Doyle’s staff had initially estimated, for example, based on Wonsan, that lift would be required for twenty-five
thousand refugees. The number evacuated grew to almost four times that number. Aside from the shipping they required, the refugees had to be fed and kept
warm while awaiting embarkation. Similarly, when the redeployment order was
received 9 December, ships were still unloading supplies; some of the supplies
were required to maintain the defensive perimeter, and the necessity for unloading them tied up some port facilities for several days. Doyle halted unloading
when possible, but then his loading officer had to devise loading plans for ships
that were not empty at the outset.
The 12th showed a marked acceleration of the loading operations. By the next
day, 55 percent of the personnel, 40 percent of the vehicles, and 70 percent of the
bulk cargo of the Marines had been loaded. Doyle finalized plans for lifting the
ROK I Corps from Hungnam to Samchok, as requested by X Corps. The corps
had estimated a requirement for twelve thousand personnel and “a few vehicles,”
and accordingly three ships had been committed. However, X Corps continued
to revise the lift requirements upward—now twenty-five thousand personnel,
seven hundred vehicles (including four hundred two-and-a-half-ton trucks), fifty
tractors, and other heavy equipment. Consequently, additional shipping was allocated. Intelligence studies and aerial reconnaissance on 13 December led to the
selection of Bokuko Ko as the landing site for the Korean units. Doyle formed TG
90.8 for that purpose on 16 December. It departed for Bokuko Ko on 17 December and commenced disembarking the following day. Meanwhile, by the 14th, 90
percent of the Marines’ personnel, 95 percent of their vehicles, and 97 percent of
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their bulk cargo had been loaded. The division sailed for Pusan the following day,
and the 7th Division commenced loading.
Loading continued on the 17th, amid forty-knot winds, heavy seas, and freezing temperatures. Ships dragged anchor, and small boats drifted loose in and out
of the harbor. Winds reached sixty knots in the open sea, and all carrier flight operations were suspended.55 At 1600 (four o’clock in the afternoon) on 19 December, General Almond embarked on Mount McKinley, and command of all shore
operations, including defense of the perimeter, passed to Doyle. The admiral
pointedly told the general, so that there could be no mistake, “You understand . . .
that these troops are now under my command.”56 It was precisely the reciprocal
of the procedure by which during an amphibious assault command passes to the
ground commander once he has established his command post ashore and so
notified the amphibious commander. At the same time, 3rd Division took over
the ground defenses.
By 20 December Doyle was confident enough of the operation’s trajectory to
set the 24th as the tentative “reverse” D-day—or “Dog Day,” as it was then known.
On the 20th, 7th Division completed loading and 3rd Division commenced
loading. By the 22nd it emerged that sufficient shipping was available to outload
another four thousand tons of ammunition and thirteen railroad boxcars (South
Korea desperately needed rolling stock). Instructions for the Dog Day embarkation were completed and distributed. On the 23rd, additional refugees went on
board U.S. ships, and Missouri reported to its assigned fire support station. Doyle
informed the beachmaster of prospective movements and the beaching sequence
of LSTs and LSUs on Dog Day. For the final withdrawal, Doyle maintained a naval gunfire barrage in a zone 2,500 yards wide about three thousand yards from
the beaches and harbor. Call fires in addition to this barrage prevented enemy
movement through the zone during the day. Doyle ordered the port director to
commence undocking all ships at the quays at 2000 (8 PM) and increased harassing fire from naval gunfire support ships. When the last friendly troops were off
the beaches, destructive fires rained down on the port area. Particular attention
was given the destruction of the remaining railroad cars.57 Hungnam port closed
at 2300. The beaches remained to be cleared the next day.
Early on the day of Christmas Eve, Doyle confirmed H-hour as 1100 (11 AM).
Simultaneously, aircraft napalmed a hundred to three hundred enemy troops
who had begun to press on the perimeter. As shown on map 4, the perimeter
was progressively and rapidly reduced until at 1100 initial combat elements, less
the covering forces, commenced loading into the LSTs and LSUs. At 1217, Army
personnel prematurely detonated two Pink Beach ammunition dumps, causing
loss of personnel and boats. By 1405, friendly forces had cleared all beaches. Five
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USS LSMR-404 and USS Begor (APD-127) stand by as U.N. troops demolish the Hungnam port facilities at the end of the evacuation, on 24 December 1950.
U.S. Navy

minutes later, demolition charges were detonated around the waterfront of the
inner harbor. At 1457, the hospital ship Consolation (AH 15) got under way, and
the general sortie from the harbor commenced. Mount McKinley departed at
1632, and the operation concluded. Not a single friendly had been left behind.58
{LINE-SPACE}
In the end, the Chinese and North Koreans elected not to attempt any serious
interference with operations at Hungnam—in part, because the 1st Marine Division and Navy and Marine air had combined with Old Man Winter to render
their forces substantially ineffective, and also, no doubt, because they understood
that “their losses would certainly have been greater than they could have hoped
to inflict. Fire power from the sea would have dwarfed what they had already
absorbed during their attack on the Marines at Chosen.”59 More ammunition
was ultimately expended at Hungnam than at the Inchon landing—but then, the
operation lasted much longer, plenty of ammunition was available, and as Doyle
later pointed out, powder and metal were much less valuable than human life.60
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Koreans prepare to board an LST during the Hungnam evacuation, 19 December 1950. Other Koreans are transferring their belongings from an ox cart to a
fishing boat, at left. Taken on Green Beach.
U.S. Navy

During fourteen days at Hungnam, the U.S. Navy embarked and redeployed
105,000 troops, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons of supplies (including fuel and ammunition stores). It also lifted 91,000 civilian refugees to safety
—a number limited only by time and available shipping. Marine and Air Force
air transports flew out an additional 3,600 troops, 196 vehicles, and 1,300 tons of
cargo. The number and types of ships employed reveal the operation’s magnitude
and complexity: one amphibious command ship (AGC), three attack transports,
three attack cargo ships, eight MSTS-operated transports and one MSTS cargo
ship, five heavy-lift time-charter vessels, fifty-one regular time-charter vessels
(Victory ships), two SCAJAP time-charter vessels, eleven U.S. Navy LSTs, twentysix SCAJAP LSTs, and three LSDs. Most vessels made multiple trips in and out of
Hungnam; for example, thirty-seven LSTs made a total of eighty-one trips.
A DECENTRALIZED, SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEM
Doyle later commented that the command relationships and operational procedures for Hungnam were unique to that special situation and probably ought not
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
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to be used as a template for future amphibious operations. Insofar as the principal factors (and their interrelationships) of future operations were not largely
identical to those that obtained at Hungnam, the admiral was absolutely correct.
At another level, however, the admiral was quite wrong and altogether too
modest. The key to the remarkable military feat at Hungnam resided in Doyle’s
implicit recognition that, however experienced they were in amphibious operations, he and his staff had never before encountered a problem even remotely
resembling that presented by Hungnam, nor did amphibious doctrine provide
any foundation. That is, he and his staff correctly assessed that they faced an illstructured problem—although they did not have that name for it.
Doyle’s decision to devise an ad hoc plan and C2 organization predicated on
the analogy of an amphibious operation executed in reverse therefore proved
pivotal. That approach allowed experts to exercise their professional judgment
freely in their areas of responsibility, to impose structure on the problems each
confronted and generate solutions for them, and to communicate informally,
directly, and quickly with others whose advice, cooperation, and coordination
were necessary. Doyle essentially established and maintained a decentralized,
self-organizing system that proved highly adaptive and flexible, well suited to the
primary constraint on the operation—time. Experimentation and rapid learning,
inevitably essential to the solution of ill-structured problems, were the rule, not
conformity to preconceived notions of doctrine and to military formalities. Even
the plan and organization themselves resulted from unusually consultative staff
planning conferences that facilitated input from those with the requisite expertise. The profound lesson of Hungnam is to be found in the manner in which the
operation was approached and organized.
UN control of adjacent sea and air enabled Doyle the complete freedom of
action sought by every commander but rarely attained by any. The responsible
naval commanders correctly understood that they could hold a perimeter at
Hungnam as long as they wished to do so, given established and sustainable control of the sea and air, and the ready availability of naval air and gunfire support.
This allowed United Nations forces to control the timing and completion of a
well organized and well executed extraction. Conversely, the enemy was limited
to ground action only, and that by an already attrited force without the heavy
weapons to threaten seriously the redeploying forces.61
That historians and the popular imagination have heretofore focused on the
Inchon landing is understandable (after all, it was an audacious assault, while
Hungnam was a withdrawal) but unfortunate. Although the decision to land at
Inchon was a difficult and daring one and succeeded operationally and tactically,
it presented no particular novelties to Doyle and his amphibious experts. MacArthur’s insistence on Inchon may have violated their professional sensibilities,
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but they possessed both doctrine and experience by which to act effectively.62 By
contrast, Hungnam presented novelty at almost every turn, and yet the amphibious group rose to the occasion.
Doyle’s ability to emplace a self-organizing system at Hungnam was predicated on the granting by Vice Admiral Joy of his demand that unlike in the Inchon
and Wonsan operations, he be permitted to exercise command independently of
the Seventh Fleet commander. Joy acceded because of his long-standing professional and personal relationship with Doyle and his practical understanding that
amphibious expertise was the factor critical to success at Hungnam. Notwithstanding his own misgivings about Joy’s decision, the CNO was unwilling or
unable to overturn it directly, and his subterfuge of sending a “representative” to
Hungnam had, in the event, no effect. For his part, Admiral Struble of Seventh
Fleet, for whom Joy’s decision must have been a bitter pill, responded fully to
Doyle’s requests for air and naval gunfire support and at the same time was able
to focus on his broader Seventh Fleet responsibilities. Similarly, the presence of a
second fully capable amphibious group in Korea under Doyle meant that Doyle
could allocate responsibility for west-coast redeployment operations to that
group, freeing himself from their detailed supervision and allowing him and his
staff to focus on Hungnam.
Several other factors also contributed both to Doyle’s willingness to employ
a self-organizing system and to its success. His initial amphibious operational
experience was as operations officer at Guadalcanal. Because such an operation
had never before been attempted, it constituted an ill-structured problem, unlike later operations in the Central Pacific, which were much better structured.63
Subsequently, Doyle served for two years in Admiral King’s amphibious planning
section. He thereby had firsthand experience with the practical matters of dealing
with ill-structured problems and the need for an adaptable and self-organizing
C2 organization.
Doyle’s staff comprised entirely officers with extensive World War II amphibious experience, men who were virtually all overqualified for their billets. The
same obtained for the officers and men of Forney’s Mobile Training Team Able.
Doyle’s staff was no ordinary collection of skilled individual officers. Rather, it
had seen little turnover and had worked together on landing exercises both stateside and in Japan prior to planning and conducting the Pohang Dong, Inchon,
and Wonsan landings, along with myriad lesser amphibious lifts. In consequence,
Doyle knew his staff members (and those of Team Able) personally and professionally in detail; the staff members knew each other in like manner, and they had
evolved effective working relationships. Experience at Inchon and Wonsan had
also established effective working relationships also with the principal ground
commanders and their staffs. These factors all conduced to the development and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
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maintenance of trust among the key participants. These men could be depended
on to do their jobs without central direction and to improvise when required.
Underlying all of this was an effective communications system at Hungnam that
permitted ready lateral coordination among the control posts.
In the end, the worst fears of the military commanders in Korea and of the
American popular press were not realized in December 1950. Hungnam was no
Dunkirk, nor from the Navy and the Marine Corps perspective had it at any time
been likely to become one. Many factors contributed to success in Hungnam,
including the availability of specialized amphibious shipping and complete
control of air and sea, but the defining factors were the presence of experienced
professionals, organized effectively, and the willingness of their commander to
let them do their jobs.
{LINE-SPACE}
After rest and recuperation at the “Bean Patch,” near Ulsan, 1st Marine Division,
still part of X Corps but the latter now integrated with Eighth Army, was ordered
out of Army reserve on 9 January 1951 to reenter the fight. The Army’s 3rd and
7th Divisions followed close behind.
In spring 1951, Rear Admiral Doyle returned to the United States for a well
deserved rest and new duties. In September that year he became president of
the Board of Inspection and Survey, serving until the following May, when he
assumed the chairmanship of the Joint Amphibious Board. Doyle retired in November 1953, in the grade of vice admiral on the retired list, on the basis of his
combat awards. He practiced law for many years in Austin, Texas, and died in 1982.
His work on the Joint Amphibious Board, rewriting existing doctrine for amphibious operations (then embodied in Naval Warfare Publication 22), proved,
in the aftermath of the defense unification battles, highly contentious. The board
completed its work at the end of Doyle’s tenure, publishing its report in January
1954. The report set forth divergent service views on “doctrines and procedures
governing joint amphibious operations” that were delaying finalization of a
jointly acceptable solution—each page was divided into thirds, with the views of
the Navy and Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force for each issue given separately.
Curiously, given its chairman’s immediate past experience at Hungnam, the report addressed only the problems of the assault, primarily matters of phasing and
of command and control.64
Today, joint doctrine, although entirely consistent with the lessons of Hungnam,
provides only minimal guidance for structuring the problem of the amphibious
withdrawal. Naval commanders and staffs not already well practiced in the amphibious assault will find only a very rough outline for approaching the problem
of the amphibious withdrawal. They are better advised to study Hungnam and its
many relatives systematically, to consult the superseded Joint Publication 3-02.1,
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Joint Doctrine for Landing Operations, of 2004, and regularly to plan and exercise
the amphibious withdrawal. The requirement for such does not come along often, but when it does, fortune will favor the prepared.
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